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This is an enjoyable, lively book, very easy to read, full of interesting
examples, on an extremely important subject. Unfortunately, though, it is more
remarkable for its piecemeal considerations as regards particular cases than for
any especially valuable general proposal concerning our theoretical understanding
of the logic involved in slippery slope arguments — ssas for short. Such general
ideas on the issue as the book espouses are sketches of a pragmatic approach
towards which the book offers several hints.
The main contention (pp. 15-6, p. 22, p. 49, pp. 64-5, p. 104, p. 139, p.
159, p. 166, p. 205, pp. 229ff.) is that, far from being necessarily fallacious, very
often ssas are acceptable, if weak, (warning) arguments in a discussion, to the
effect that taking a certain step may be fraught with indirect results which could
eventually turn out disastrous — not as an unavoidable outcome, but as a quite
possible upshot (p. 102, p. 112, p. 156). Thus construed, ssas shift the burden
of proof. A proponent is advocating a certain step. The critic advances a ssa by
showing that, once that step has been taken, there is a presumption that some
kind of pressure towards further steps may quite possibly be hard to resist, the
thus triggered process yielding a bleak result. Once such an argument has been
advanced, it is up to the proponent to show that it is reasonable to hope that the
process will not go on, that there is some good stopping point at which a sharp
line can be drawn. What alone is fallacious with some ssas is wording them as
if they were conclusive, non-defeasible or deductively valid reasonings allowing
a strong rejection of the proposal and thus closing the discussion.
The wealth of examples and cases is not parallelled with a comparable
depth of approach. There are difficulties concerning the core idea just described
which are not addressed. The discussion of alternative views is cursory and in
some cases almost boils down to an off-hand dismissal with little in the way of
serious consideration.
I think such a drawback is all the more regrettable as it leaves us not just
with a deficient understanding of the logic of ssas, but more seriously with no
practical proposal for solving at least a broad range of such cases. Some people
blame philosophers for failing to put forward practical solutions to human
dilemmas. This book contains only a few practical proposals (mainly in its 7th and
final chapter, «Practical Advice on Tactics», pp. 242ff.), which are rules of thumb
as to how to react to ssas in a discussion, not really constructive recommenda-
tions as to how the conflicts can be solved. Walton is noncommittal on almost
every particular controversy he broaches in the book.
Let me elaborate. Many ssas are ensuant on the gap between a continu-
ous underlying series of characteristics — the input — and a discontinuous and
sometimes just two-valued output. Walton fails to emphasize such a gap, but I
have gathered the impression that he would not strongly disagree with such a
point. The cleavage under consideration gives rise to difficult dilemmas. Speeding
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is a continuous property, but as it is implemented in our societies fining is not: if
you are caught exceeding the allowed speed, even by an exiguous fraction, you
are fined, no less than if you had driven your car like mad; and if you dangerously
verge on the allowed limit amidst a dense traffic but with no rule breaking, you
are safe — as far as fine imposition is concerned. Likewise, if you are 17 years
of age, an energetic, intelligent, politically aware young man or woman, you
cannot vote (even though you can be sent to prison), but if you have just attained
your 18th birthday, then you are supposed to have “come of age” and you are
entitled to vote, even if you know nothing of politics and care less. With eutha-
nasia, abortion and many other subjects, such dilemmas are more serious. Law
as usually conceived only seldom allows of middle courses, and is prone to all-or-
nothing attitudes.
Any proposal about ssas which has no practical recommendation to offer
towards reconciling those opposite poles of reality and law seems to me deficient.
The deficiency in the present case is due to a lack of logical appraisal. Walton
shares the classical logician’s view of two-valuedness. He claims (pp. 207 ff.) that
formal proposals about ssas have failed because they have resorted to many-
valued logics advocating truth-value gaps, which does not help to improve our
practical treatment of such dilemmas. Now, there are several confusions here. For
one thing, although multiple-valued logics can be construed in such a way that
the intermediary truth values are looked upon as truth-value gaps, this is not the
most common interpretation. On the other hand truth value gaps do not need
many-valuedness. They can be accounted for with a super-valuation semantics
like van Fraassen’s. For another thing, at least some multiple-valued approaches
hinge upon the notion of degrees of truth, which ensue in a quite different treat-
ment of ssas, one which does not relinquish the principle of excluded middle.
And, last, a multiple-valued logic approach can do what Walton’s account fails to
do, offering a recommendation on practical solutions, namely: as far as possible,
keep clear of two-valued outputs when the inputs are infinite-valued.
But is it possible? Again, a classically minded logician — such as Walton
— would think not. Age is continuous, whereas you cannot grant a continuously
increasing right of vote. You cannot establish a continuous system of fines in
virtue of which the amount due varies according to your speed excess. And so
on. All that seems clear and reasonable. Is it? No, I do not think so. I am quite
convinced that it is only laziness which prevents us from devising a subtler way
of handling rights and wrongs. Again, this is no all-or-nothing issue. Our juridic
practice cannot completely fit the continuous series of variations in reality, but the
discrepancy can be decreased considerably, at least in many cases.
In fact, a juridical advance has been accomplished since the 18th century
precisely by acknowledging degree variations where our ancestors failed to
envisage them. Capital punishment was inflicted on many “crimes” which now-
adays are minor offenses and receive moderate punishment. Yet in other
respects the all-or-nothing attitude is still with us. Jurists spend a lot of time
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redrawing the boundaries, and only seldom recommending an abandonment of
any sharp boundary.
Walton is quite convinced (p. 50, pp. 58-9, p. 209, p. 236), that the sorites
type of ssa — one of the four main types in his classification, along with the
causal, the precedent and the full ssas — ensues on the vagueness of key
concepts or terms, i.e., on uncertainty as to where the line is to be drawn. He
doesn’t for a moment challenge the assumption that the line has to be drawn.
Why?
In the first place, “vagueness” is not indisputably the root of the problem,
for vagueness is not the same as graduality. A statement may be vague because
of pragmatic considerations concerning the context of utterance: the utterer is
expected to convey more specific information and instead he contents himself
with general remarks; thus what he says is vague. Terms can be said to be
vague in so far as they are used in vague statements. Yet on their own they are
not vague. ‘Tall’ is not vague. It is a term denoting a property which comes in
degrees. The issue is not vagueness but graduality. (I shall return to this central
issue at the end of this review.)
The discussion on euthanasia — an issue Walton rightly emphasizes — is
not due to vagueness of such expressions as ‘letting die’, ‘actively causing the
death’, ‘complying with the patient’s willingness repeatedly expressed in a state
of clear conscience and not in a moment of transitory despair’, and so on. Such
phrases can be used in a vague manner, but they can also be used with no
vagueness. Yet all of them denote properties which admit of degrees. It seems
to the present reviewer very likely that at most a generation hence euthanasia will
be legal everywhere with provisos of this sort, the Dutch having been the pion-
eers. The irrational resistance comes most of all from the maximalistic attitude:
since those provisos are matters of degree — and of aspect too —, there is no
way of drawing the line so as to put a stop to a conceivable deterioration leading
to compulsory medical killing of socially undesirable people. Well, yes, if it comes
to either whole guilt or absolute innocence, with nothing in between, then it is
difficult, if not impossible, to draw any line at all — not even the one that suppos-
edly is now enacted, except that it is whatever may now be in operation. The
difference between failing to give a medicament and providing one is relative: is
providing serum with no nourishing qualities just non-action? (Is starving a cripple
purely negative? Walton seems implicitly to accept such an Aristotelian radical
distinction, but he does not go into the issue with any detail.) But if we think of
ourselves as not completely innocent of misdeeds, and acknowledge that many
actions can be both praiseworthy up to a point and yet also reprehensible to
some extent, if we try to overcome the two-valuedness of our juridical systems,
replacing it, in so far as it is feasible, with systems of scales, our attitudes can
become more reasonable and less strained. A physician’s action may be much
more meritorious than blamable. A different action of another physician, very like
the first one, may still be a little less meritorious and a little more blamable. And
so on. Unless and until we adopt such a good common sense, unless and until
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we cease concocting hard and rigid patterns with heaven on the right, hell on the
left, and nothing in-between, only a bad casuistry is possible. Walton defends
casuistry and rightly so, since he correctly points to qualities in the jesuitic casu-
istry which Pascal grossly overlooked. Yet, the main flaw with casuistry was
precisely its resorting to self-deception by fancying that with some proviso —
whose whole spelling-out may take hundreds of volumes of fine writing — an
action may be perfectly and absolutely blameless, whereas failing to comply with
just a little detail of the conjunctive proviso may render the action a mortal sin.
As for abortion — another highly emphasized case in Walton’s book (pp.
45 ff., 140 ff., etc) — more or less the same can be said. If we have only the two
opposite terms of ‘person’ and ‘an entity which is no person at all’, i.e., if failing
to completely be a person amounts to completely failing to be one, and killing the
former entirely deserves punishment whereas putting an end to the life of the
latter is of no consequence whatsoever, then of course we are left with the
unsavoury choice of either saying that personhood begins at birth (what of the
emerging baby, when only a hand is outside the womb?), or at the joining of the
gametes (what about the spermatozoid having just touched the ovule?) or with
some profoundly inspired maxim, to the effect that personhood begins at the
259201 minute after conception. All that is absurd, isn’t it? But the absurdity is
brought about by legal enforcement of two-valuedness. I agree that legal practice
cannot be as subtle, fluid and fuzzy as life and truth are, but they can be a little
less rigid, less absurdly crisp than they are commonly supposed and expected to
be.
All this is down to earth. What is its connection with logic? Quite simply, if
truth doesn’t admit of degree, and if applications of words are either completely
all right or else absolute misnomers, then we are bound to champ at the bit and
resign ourselves to juridic casuistry, drawing arbitrary lines on the ground of
devious, lengthy and disingenuous provisos which the lawyer alone can master.
When discussing the logical structure of ssas, Walton takes for granted,
with no critical canvassing at all, that modus ponens is involved. Under CL
(Classical Logic) ‘r if p’ is of course equivalent to ‘r or not-p’, i.e. to ‘Not both p
and not-r’. But in many non-classical logics things are not like that. The sorites-
engendering principle can be formulated like this (SEP):
(SEP) If B differs from A, in having F, only by a small margin, and A has property
F to a certain degree, d, then, if, on this account, A has (or is bound to
have) also property G, B has property G, too.
(SEP) is rejected by many a nonclassical logical approach. What is
accepted is what I shall be calling — in accordance with Walton’s line — the
principle of consistency, PC for short, namely:
(PC) If B differs from A, in having F, only by a small margin, and A has property
F to a certain degree, d, then it is not the case that, on this account, A has
(or is bound to have) also property G, but B does not have property G.
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But modus ponens does not allow to infer ‘r’ from the premises ‘p’ and ‘Not
both p and not-r’. For suppose ‘p’ is only partly true. Then it can be safely
asserted with [partial] truth that p, but also that not p. Since not-p, it is not the
case that p (heed the difference between its just not being the case that p and
its completely failing to be the case that p). Since it is not the case that p, not
both p and s — for any ‘s’, including ‘not-r’. But from such a [partial] truth you
cannot conclude ‘r’, which for all we know may be an utter falsity. Likewise, the
claim (which can be regarded as a particular case of PC — see below) that it isn’t
the case that the 259200 minutes foetus is a non-human-being and the 259201
minutes foetus is not a non-human-being, together with the claim that the former
is [at least to some extent] a non-human-being, does not entail the conclusion
that the 259201 minutes foetus is a non-human-being. Probably it is not (alto-
gether) a human being, but you cannot draw such a conclusion only on the
strength of the premises. At most we have here a defeasible presumption —
using a notion Walton makes much of. Yet Walton has no doubt that what is
involved here is a quite unobjectionable modus ponens.
Furthermore, even if we accept the claim that, if the 259200 minutes foetus
is a non-human, then the 259201 foetus is also a non-human, even then all is not
logically as straightforward as Walton imagines. For he then applies to this sort
of case both modus ponens and modus tollens (p. 215, p. 226). Now, several
non-classical logics do not admit modus tollens for the couple of connectives
formed by mere (simple, natural) negation and mere conditional, ‘if’. They admit
modus tollens for the couple formed by the mere conditional and strong negation
(‘not…at all’), and also for the couple formed by implication (‘to the extent that…’)
and mere negation. Thus, according to such logics the two following reasonings
are valid:
To the extent [at least] that p, q; not-q Not-p.
If p, q; It isn’t the case that q at all It isn’t the case that p at all.
Whereas the following one is invalid:
If p, q; not-q Not-p.
So, even were it true that, if the 259200 minutes foetus is not a human
being, then neither is the 259201 minutes foetus, it wouldn’t necessarily follow
from that premise plus the claim that the latter is a human being that the former
is one. Again we may have here only a defeasible nondeductive reasoning to that
effect — just where Walton thinks he is treading on firm soil.
Walton admits of course that many terms involved in ssas are vague, as
he puts it (see p. 227). What he means (see pp. 227-8) is that those words have
a clear zone of “definite” application, a clear zone of “definite” non-application,
and a grey zone of (non-definite?) uncertainty. But definiteness and uncertainty
have nothing to do with our present concern. We are uncertain about the exten-
sion of many mathematical properties, which are none the more vague for such
a reason. On the other hand, typically fuzzy words do not involve uncertainty. It
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is not that I am uncertain about whether or not the three months foetus is a living
person; what happens is that it is one [to some extent], but less so than your one
year old girl. Not that the issue is not a yes/no question, but only that it is not just
such a question; it is also a how much question. (According to some people it is
senseless to say that it is 37.472 % true, because purportedly issues of that kind
do not admit of such precision; the claim seems to me as reasonable as saying
that temperature does not admit of precise measure, because you do not feel that
it is now 31.237 degrees hot, but just that it is hot.)
There are a number of separate difficulties for Walton’s approach. For
instance, he does not broach the question of why he thinks that trenchant or
strong claims close a discussion, whereas weak, cautious half claims keep it
going (see p. 104, p. 164, p. 203 and passim). It seems obvious to the reviewer
that this is not necessarily so, but Walton takes it for granted. Also, he contends
that a ssa is fallacious only when it is advanced so as to shut off the flow of
questioning, to hinder or even block the sequence of the dialogue. Is there any
formal mark to be found in virtue of which we can say that such is the case? In
other words, can two debate-behaviours be exactly alike in their perceivable
manifestations, only one of them being fallacious, in the sense Walton uses the
term? If so, have we to scan the arguer’s mind — or rely on some mysterious
“intuition” — in order to say he is committing a fallacy? (Walton rejects such a
psychologistic approach — p. 34. I am not sure, though, his whole account really
keeps clear of it.)
I do not deny Walton’s pragmatic account has real merit. I accept his two
dichotomies — duly fuzzified and only partly overlapping: that between tranchant
claims and hedged considerations; and that between pronouncments aimed at
closing a discussion and those which tend to keep it going. However it seems
clear to me that, in such matters, a fallacy is committed only when a sharp line
is claimed to be needed where in fact none can be reasonably drawn — the very
nature of the properties involved asking for a gradualistic approach.
There is also a problem concerning the logic underlying Walton’s own
approach. He adheres to CL and dismisses many-valued logics. Yet he uses
expressions like ‘to the extent that’ (p. 94), ‘not fully’, comparatives — e.g. he
speaks (p. 121) of a precedent being more binding that another on a court —,
and so on. What can be a plausible treatment of the denotations of such express-
ions compatible with CL?
A different problem which Walton fails to raise is whether the norms of
obligation concerning the furtherance of discussion — non compliance with which
amounts to fallacy — are prudential rules, or moral duties. The moralistic under-
tones seem to me noticeable, and Walton’s choice of words can hardly be
ascribed to coincidence (‘it would be unfair’ and so on). But is a strongly norma-
tive approach required in such a context? Is not a merely instrumental view to be
preferred on account of its greater simplicity?
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Walton defends a relaxation of the standards of strict consistency (p. 67),
but he doesn’t define what ‘consistency’ means here. It seems clear to me that
he means what I have called above the principle of consistency. Yet, he firmly
adheres to CL. Why is such a relaxation permissible? How can an utterly illogical
procedure be tolerated? (If you are a CL adherent you cannot accept degrees of
logicality; hence such stances as are not entirely logical are totally and downright
illogical.)
I shall bring this review to a close by focusing on the relationship between
Walton’s book and patterns of thought and linguistic behaviour. If truth admits of
degree, if designation (denotation) admits of degrees, if a reasonable approach
to our moral and legal judgments and practices would entail a step-by-step
departure from rigid dichotomies, favouring a more gradualistic approach —
nothing of which is to be found in Walton’s book —, can we be confident that the
gradualistic approach which is then required in both logic and juridical doctrine is
compatible with the inner patterns of our thought process?
A very simple hypothesis springs to the mind — and has been put forward
by some authors — namely that our thought process is bound by innate
dichotomist constraints. Were such a hypothesis true, we could have an explana-
tion of the widespread adherence to two-valuedness, viz. some species-specific
leaning towards a discrete pattern even where in reality there is none. Such an
explanation is attractive and ambitious. It explains why so often people adhere du
stiff dichotomies — whereas reality displays a continuum — and try to proceed
by jumps — while only step by step advances are practicable or reasonable.
What the explanation does not account for is why so often those attitudes result
in failure, and have to be patched up towards a less drastic departure from
continuism. Neither does it explain why continuist attitudes are not infrequent
among humans, at many stages of our species’s development. If humans are that
dichotomist, how can we explain the existence of comparatives and related
expressions in all known languages of our planet (and even constructions which
allow nouns to be terms of comparison, as happens in English through the phrase
‘more of … than’, and in other languages in a more straightforward manner)?
How can we account for the fact that very often the so-called primitive religions
see a full scale of transitions whereas only purportedly superior religious doctrines
introduce cut-offs and in fact abysmal chasms? And how do you explain that in
turn such dualistic doctrines are superseded by more sophisticated views which
revert to a continuistic look at the world?
I regard the dichotomist constraint with extreme cautiousness. There is at
least as much evidence against the hypothesis as there is in its support. More-
over, if dichotomism is wrong, such explanations are of little help. They provide
a consolation of sorts for our shortcomings by persuading us that we are like that,
that we cannot free ourselves of them. But we can, of course. And, after all,
humans have also had non-dichotomist attitudes for thousands upon thousands
of years. So perhaps a different hypothesis can be advanced: it is not that human
thought in general is that two-valuedness ridden. You cannot blame every bad
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feature of many men and women on human nature “as such”. It is just that
sluggishness often gets the better of us. A principle of economy is all right, of
course. But there must be an economic way of applying the principle, by compar-
ing the costs and the returns. A dichotomist outlook may impose an excessive
economy, skimping at the high price of divorcing ourselves from reality.
In fact gradualism is not alien to ordinary human views and ways of speak-
ing, far from it. Indeed the overwhelming majority of our words admit of degrees
in their application and lend themselves to some sort of qualification by hedges,
comparisons, and degree expressions. Usually the context implicitly makes it
clear which threshold has to be attained for an expression to be suitable enough.
When that does not happen, the phrase is used in a vague manner. Thus ‘human’
admits of degrees — if modern palaeontology is right. But in ordinary contexts
there is no doubt about the threshold, since among the animals which now exist
the line between humans and non-humans is sharp. In a number of contexts, the
threshold is not clearly provided, and in those contexts saying ‘It (or he or she)
is (or was or will be) a human’ is to make a vague statement. The question is
automatically invited: ‘How much human?’ — in the same way as in some con-
texts to say that someone is tall is vague, the question arising of how tall he or
she is.
Walton discusses none of those issues (I think he should have done). After
all he tries to implement a pragmatic approach to the treatment of slippery slope
arguments, which seems to me right. But a good account of such arguments
cannot be only pragmatic — a logical assessment of the validity of the arguments
is also called for as we have seen. On the other hand, a satisfactory pragmatic
approach has to explain that vagueness is a matter of use, not of meaning, as I
have argued in the foregoing paragraph.
Lorenzo Peña
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